LAUFER (DO NOT DELETE)

10/22/2013 2:17 PM

Picture This: Campaign Finance Law and the Question
of Values
Laurence D. Laufer*
I. INTRODUCTION
A campaign is not an election. No matter how well-financed its
advertising, a campaign’s success depends entirely on whether voters
“buy” what is being “sold” on Election Day. Campaign finance law
sets standards for how candidates and others finance their efforts to
persuade (or dissuade) voters in an election.
The effort to limit the role of money in federal elections is
1
reflected in laws that date back over a century. In the 2012 federal
elections, the state of campaign finance law reflected the failure of
legislation to achieve a comprehensive set of limitations. The laws on
2
3
the books have been superseded by judicially imposed barriers to
4
limitations. As a result, complex regulations enforce arguably
vestigial limits. This campaign finance regime is overseen by a
5
partisan mindset in Congress and at the Federal Election
Commission, which also serves to block legislative or regulatory
6
innovation.
The judicial decision most vilified and celebrated in this area is,
* Partner, Genova Burns Giantomasi Webster LLC, New York, New York. Mr.
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associate, Alexandra M. Hill, assisted in the preparation of this article.
1
Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65.
2
See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
88 Stat. 1263; Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
3
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Davis
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
4
Federal Election Commission regulations are codified as Title 11 of the Code
of Federal Regulations.
5
See
Testy
Gridlock,
THE
ECONOMIST,
May
19,
2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21555610; Jonathan Backer, Gridlock and
Dysfunction on Display at FEC Oversight Hearing, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y.U.
SCHOOL OF LAW, Nov. 4. 2011, available at http://www.brennancenter.org
/blog/gridlock-and-dysfunction-display-fec-oversight-hearing.
6
Donald F. McGahn, Caroline Hunter & Matthew Petersen, Hard Truths of
Campaign Finance, POLITICO, May 8, 2013, http://www.politico.com/story
/2013/05/hard-truths-of-campaign-finance-91084.html#ixzz2SpNL0lEv.
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7

of course, Citizens United. Viewed least cynically, that decision is a
celebration of the original American value of e pluribus unum—“out of
many, one.” The majority opinion recognizes that political debate is
fueled by much more than mere giving in response to candidate or
political party calls for funds to pay for the recipient’s speech. The
Court extols the constitutional value of other voices—independent
8
voices.
This gives rise to the controversial conclusion that
“independent expenditures, including those made by corporations,
9
do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”
But the Court does not rest on this negative premise. The Court
states that independent expenditures are a positive democratic force
because “an independent expenditure is political speech presented
to the electorate . . . . The fact that a corporation, or any other
speaker, is willing to spend money to try to persuade voters
presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected
10
officials.”
[S]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is
the means to hold officials accountable to the people. . . .
The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use
information to reach consensus is a precondition to
enlightened self-government and a necessary means to
11
protect it.
This libertarian vision of heaven either naively discounts
persuasion imbalances caused by economic might or astutely shackles
big government’s ability to control a political process that may be
ugly but must remain free. Or, it may do both.
Because politics is ongoing and campaigns for elections are
nearly always underway, there is virtually no chance to simply shut
down the current system and build a new one from scratch (absent a
12
The rules today
very-hard-to-achieve constitutional amendment).
7

558 U.S. 310 (2010); Sean Higgens, Citizens United: The Dog that Never Barked,
WASH. EXAMINER, Nov. 13, 2012 3:00 PM, http://washingtonexaminer.com/
citizens-united-the-dog-that-never-barked/article/2513358# (“The howls of outrage
began almost immediately after the Supreme Court ruled on Citizens United v.
Federal Elections [sic] Commission in January 2010. It continued for months
afterward.”).
8
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314–15.
9
Id. at 357.
10
Id. at 360.
11
Id. at 339.
12
John Celock, West Virginia House of Delegates Calls for Citizens United
Constitutional
Amendment,
HUFFINGTON
POST,
Mar.
28,
2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/28
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will likely be the rules for the foreseeable future, with some
incremental erosion and adjustment, presumably as a result of
further litigation. But that does not mean there is not a strong case
to be made for various kinds of reform.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. First, I draw a thumb-nail
sketch of the federal law as it exists today (and these federal law
concepts generally have their parallels in most state and local
13
campaign finance regulations). Second, I offer a brief catalogue of
predominant critiques of three significant components of current law
follows, taking note of commonly suggested avenues for reform.
Finally, I turn to the Essay’s main focus: an exercise for identifying
common values that should be served by campaign finance laws.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME
Congress has periodically sought to curb the role of money in
14
politics. In the early 1970s, it supplemented long-standing bans on
corporate and union spending with limits on individual contributions
to federal candidates, limits on spending by candidates and others in
relation to candidates, public disclosure requirements, and a system
15
for publicly funding presidential candidates. In 1976, the Supreme
Court pushed back. In its decision in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court
upheld the contribution limits, disclosure requirements, and public
financing, but narrowed the scope of spending subject to public
16
disclosure and struck down spending limits.

/west-virginia-citizens-united_n_2974556.html; Kathleen Miles, Citizens United:
California Poised To Become Largest Electorate To Vote On Constitutional Amendment,
HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 21, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/21
/citizens-united-california-constitutional-amendment_n_2728560.html.
13
For more detailed summaries, see, for example, Money in Politics 101: What You
Need to Know About Campaign Finance After Citizens United, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE
AT N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW, Sept. 28, 2012, available at http://www.brennancenter.org
/analysis/money-politics-101-what-you-need-know-about-campaign-finance-aftercitizens-united; James Bennet, The New Price of American Politics, THE ATLANTIC, Sept.
19, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the/309086/.
14
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551
U.S. 449 (2007); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
15
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972);
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263.
16
424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Buckley court upheld spending limits for presidential
candidates as a condition for the acceptance of public funds. See id. at 57 n.65.

LAUFER (DO NOT DELETE)

1212

10/22/2013 2:17 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1209

In the 2002 McCain-Feingold law, Congress placed all federal
candidate and national party fundraising under the federal
contribution limits and extended the ban on corporate and union
17
spending to electioneering communications. After exempting issue
18
advocacy from the corporate spending ban, the Court threw out the
ban on corporate (and union) spending altogether in Citizens United,
19
while again upholding public disclosure requirements.
This decades-long clash between Congress and the Court has
helped hone the policies that the state may—and may not—advance
through campaign finance regulation. Specifically, Congress may
adopt laws to curb the risk that money corrupts or appears to corrupt
elected officials, which the Court has narrowly defined to be quid pro
quo corruption. But under the First Amendment, as the Court made
clear, government may not impose restrictions to foster fair
20
competition or disadvantage some classes of speakers (such as
21
corporations) in making their voices heard. These principles also
22
extend to the financing of state and local election campaigns.
Thus, in the 2012 federal elections, candidates, and political
parties raised funds under contribution limits, disclosed their sources
of funding, and were able to make expenditures without regard to
23
opposing candidates’ levels of financing. Corporations and unions
were forbidden from making contributions to federal candidates and
political committees (although these entities are permitted to do so
24
in many state and local elections).
Individuals were subject to
aggregate limits on contributions to federal candidates and political
25
committees in an election cycle. Political action committees making
17

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
19
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
20
See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806
(2011).
21
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (“[T]he Government may not suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit
corporations.”).
22
See Am. Traditional P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
23
11 C.F.R. § 110.1 (2010); 11 C.F.R. § 102.9 (2002); see Davis v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 744–45 (2008) (striking down Millionaire’s Amendment to
BCRA).
24
11 C.F.R. § 114.2 (2007); see, e.g., 15 Del. C. § 8010 (2013); FLA. STAT. § 106.08
(2012); Md. Code Elec. Law § 13-226 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-11.3 (2009);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1314 (2004).
25
See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012),
prob. juris. noted, 133 S. Ct. 1242 (2013) (challenging the constitutionality of the
18
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contributions were subject to both source and size restrictions on the
funds they raised.
The actors who populate this universe—
candidates, political parties, contributors and associations of
contributors (PACs)—must adhere to limits on funding efforts to
26
persuade voters. Call them the “Limited.”
There is another parallel universe of “outside” spending that
helps or hurts candidates. The actors here include: individuals,
corporations and labor unions making independent expenditures or
electioneering communications.
“Super PACs” are another
mechanism for outside spending. A Super PAC is an association of
contributors raising unlimited sums, including from individuals,
corporations and unions, to spend on political advertising that is not
coordinated with candidates. Also, nonprofit organizations may raise
unlimited sums from undisclosed sources to pay for advertisements
and other activity with an apparent aim for electoral outcome. These
outside spending activities are not subject to limits on funding efforts
to persuade voters. These actors are the “Unlimited.”
III. CONTRIBUTION LIMITS, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, AND PUBLIC
FINANCING
Current jurisprudence rejects the universality of limitations.
The cliché that money is like water suggests that limitations may be
27
an exercise in futility. Removing limitations universally, however,
may be unappetizing as well since experience also teaches that money
28
is a means for corruption.
Three core components of campaign finance reform are
constitutional under the First Amendment: candidate contribution
limits, public disclosure requirements, and public financing. Each
29
component has survived stress testing in the courts. While a more
coherent federal law could be built on these foundations, no grand
biennial aggregate contribution limit as applied to contributions to non-candidate
and candidate committees. The case was heard in the October 2013 term of the
Supreme Court).
26
11 C.F.R. § 110.1 (2010).
27
See Joel M. Gora, Buckley v. Valeo: A Landmark of Political Freedom, 33 AKRON L.
REV. 7, 26 (1999) (“Trying to equalize political opportunity and influence through
limiting political speech and association is a futile task.”).
28
Richard Hasen, Opinion, Of Super PACs and Corruption, POLITICO, Mar. 22,
2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/74336.html.
29
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding contribution limits, public
disclosure, and public financing); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386
(2000) (contribution limits); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,
366 (2010) (disclosure requirements).
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30

bargain appears likely.
Indeed, partisan polarization is perhaps
most acute when it comes to redrawing campaign finance rules. The
incumbent protection instincts of those elected under the existing
31
framework also help ensure further legislative stagnation.
A. Contribution Limits
Candidates remain subject to contribution limits on the funds
they raise.
Given the governmental interest in diminishing
candidates’ susceptibility to corruption by money, that is a good
thing; or is it?
1. Critique from the Right
The candidate’s message to voters is being drowned out by
32
unlimited outside spending. Candidates risk ceding control of their
campaigns to outside spenders, who may not be “on message” even
when intending to be supportive. The candidate may then be
unfairly held accountable for circumstances beyond her control.
Removal of contribution limits would put the candidates on a level
playing field with these other spenders and enable candidates (or
political parties) to absorb funding that is now arguably inefficiently
33
directed into outside spending channels.
2. Critique from the Left
Large contributions to outside spenders are corrupting
candidates because (1) the outside spender is not truly independent
of the candidate and/or (2) the candidate will feel beholden to, or
34
threatened by, the outside spender once elected to office. Such
30

See McGahn, supra note 6.
See Joel M. Gora, Free Speech, Fair Elections, and Campaign Finance Laws: Can They
Co-Exist?, 56 HOW. L.J 763, 791 (2013) (“[R]emember who is writing the campaign
finance rules. The people in power. Do not be shocked if they write those rules in
ways most guaranteed to perpetuate their power.”).
32
When Other Voices Are Drowned Out, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/opinion
/when-other-voices-are-drowned-out.html?_r=0.
33
Paul Blumenthal, David Axelrod: Remove Campaign Contribution Limits to End
POST,
Feb.
20,
2013,
Super
PACs’
Game,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/20/
david-axelrod-campaign-contributions_n_2725613.html.
34
Richard L. Hasen, The Biggest Danger of Super PACs, CNN.COM, Jan. 9, 2012,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/09/opinion/hasen-super-pacs (“A candidate who
receives a large contribution will feel grateful to the contributor, and legislative
policy could well skew in the contributor’s direction.”).
31
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candidates will be prone to represent the interests of big spenders.
Here an obvious middle ground would be to increase
contribution limits to candidates while narrowing the range of activity
treated as independent. To the extent that the scope of activity
treated as constitutionally protected independent expenditures may
be narrowed by expanding statutory or regulatory tests for
coordination, contribution limits could become applicable to the
financing of a broader range of speech.
B. Public Disclosure
In upholding public disclosure requirements for outside
spenders, the Supreme Court found that disclosure enables voters
(and other audiences, specifically shareholders) to “react to the
speech . . . in a proper way,” by understanding the interest of the
36
speaker. “[T]ransparency enables the electorate to make informed
decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and
37
messages.”
1. Critique from the Right
Government should not compel disclosure by corporate
speakers because they may face economic reprisals, harassment, or
intimidation that threatens to indirectly limit the speech Citizens
United said could not be limited. (This objection is ironic. While the
First Amendment allows political speech to be financed by private
economic activity, the Right deems private economic actions in
response to political speech suspect.) Disclosure has become a
stalking horse for re-imposing unconstitutional restrictions through
intimidation.
2. Critique from the Left
Justice Kennedy posited, “[w]ith the advent of the Internet,
prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide . . . information
needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for
38
their positions and supporters.” But the current disclosure regime

35

Id. (“I am greatly concerned that when Election Day is over and the public will
stop hearing about Super PACs, contributions to these groups will skew public policy
away from the public interest and toward the interest of the new fat cats of campaign
finance . . . .”).
36
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010).
37
Id.
38
Id. at 370.
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has broken down. As outside spending has increased, the actual
contributors to Super PACs may be obscured by intermediation of
their contributions through shell companies and 501(c)(4)
39
organizations. To the extent Citizens United was a compromise, to
the effect that limits may be safely removed precisely because
disclosure is mandatory, the disclosure pillar should not only be
40
maintained but enhanced.
Could a middle ground be fashioned that clarifies when
501(c)(4) organizations (and other “non-political” entities) would be
required to disclose political activity and funding sources, while also
imposing new safeguards against illegal harassment and reprisals?
C. Public Financing
Public financing is government action that affirmatively
promotes political speech and gives candidates an alternative to
41
funding by large private contributions.
1. Critique from the Right
This big government scheme forces taxpayers to support
politicians they do not support. Public financing is pernicious
because it breeds an entitlement class of politicians and operatives. It
is both wasteful and unnecessary since candidates are free to raise an
unlimited number of small donations and wage successful campaigns
without need of any public subsidy, as the success of Barack Obama’s
39

See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2013) (“Civic leagues or organizations not organized
for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local
associations of employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a
designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net earnings of
which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.”);
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2013) (“An organization is operated exclusively
for the promotion of social welfare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some
way the common good and general welfare of . . . the community.”).
40
Daniel Winik, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and Disclaimer for Corporate
Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622 (2010) (arguing for
broader disclosure and disclaimer definitions); Letter from Brennan Center for
Justice
to
Elizabeth
M.
Murphy
(Aug.
19.
2013),
available
at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/161376997/Letter-to-SEC-on-Corporate-PoliticalSpending-Disclosure-Requirement (arguing for SEC to require disclosure of
corporate political activity).
41
Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563,
577–78 (1999) (“[D]ramatically unequal campaign spending that re• ects underlying
inequalities of wealth is in sharp tension with the one person, one vote principle
enshrined in our civic culture and our constitutional law. Public funding is necessary
to bring our campaign • nance system more in line with our central value of political
equality.”).
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two non-publicly-financed campaigns for president demonstrates.
2. Critique from the Left

Many on the Left embrace government funding solutions. The
matching of small donations may spur greater individual political
43
activity. As public dollars supplant private, candidates become less
beholden to special interests, more responsive to the general interest
of their constituents, and more engaged in outreach to persons of
limited means. Public funds motivate greater citizen participation in
elections and therefore create more “small-d” democracy.
It is hard to identify middle ground solely on the question of
public funding between those who reject it categorically and those
who think it a panacea. Instead of that fruitless quest, imagine a
public financing system with full disclosure but no contribution limits
other than those candidates voluntarily accept as a condition for
44
receiving public funds. Would this be a fair middle ground that
preserves everyone’s options and objectives, or simply the worst of all
possible campaign finance worlds?
IV. AN EXERCISE: WHAT VALUES SHOULD CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
SERVE?
The prospect for crafting new campaign finance law, other than
through attrition by litigation, is depressing. Each new corruption
scandal creates an almost gleeful reaction among reform advocates as
the camel’s-back-breaking outrage that might just finally spur long45
sought legislation.
With continued partisan gridlock, however,
American campaign finance law—at least at the federal level—will
42

See generally Molly J. Walker Wilson, The New Role of the Small Donor in Political
Campaigns and the Demise of Public Funding, 25 J.L. & POL. 257, 265 (2009)(“Obama
drew record support from small donors . . . In the case of a campaign in which the
funds originate with many small donors, the result may well be increased
accountability, legitimacy, and deliberative democratic involvement.”).
43
Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Bruscoe & Brendan Glavin, Small Donors, Big
Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States, ELECTION
L.J. (2012), available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/NYC-as-a-Model_ELJ_AsPublished_March2012.pdf (noting that New York City’s matching fund system has
increased the extent to which candidates rely on small donations).
44
See McDonald v. New York City Campaign Finance Board, 2013 NY Slip Op
23153 (holding against state law preemption of local law extending contribution
limits to non-publicly financed candidates). Note: the author represented the
plaintiff and the case is on appeal.
45
Mike Desmond, Albany Scandals Spur Call for Public Campaign Financing, WBFO
88.7: NPR NEWS & MORE (May 14, 2013, 10:08 AM), http://news.wbfo.org/post
/albany-scandals-spur-call-public-campaign-financing.
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likely remain a stilted product of unconscious design for a very long
46
time to come.
When faced with this kind of reality, fantasy beckons, the fantasy
47
to craft radical or comprehensive reform systems, or to indulge
48
dreams of complete deregulation, or to press for constitutional
amendments to restore corporations to their intended position of
49
service to actual human beings, or to somehow control the political
power of money in a capitalistic society. The remainder of this essay
indulges a different fantasy.
Think of a blank canvas and try to contemplate the values the
American public thinks campaign finance laws should serve in a
democratic political system. Then consider the following exercise.
In every campaign finance regulatory scheme, there are three
essential players: (1) speakers, (2) candidates, and (3) voters. What
rules should apply to each of them?
Let’s first look at Speakers. What impressions may be drawn
50
from the following depiction?

46

See McGahn, supra note 6.
See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS
CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 264–304 (2011).
48
Bradley A. Smith, The Myth of Campaign Finance Reform, NATIONAL AFFAIRS
(Winter 2010), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-myth-ofcampaign-finance-reform.
49
See, e.g., Tony Romm, Specter Pitches Constitutional Amendment in Response to
(Jan.
21,
2010,
7:25
PM),
Citizens
United
Case,
THEHILL.COM
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/77473-specter-pitchesconstitutional-amendment-in-response-to-citizens-united-case.
50
Of course the choice of picture is key for evoking particular judgments. Here
I am exercising an author’s prerogative. Different choices by a different author
would likely result in a different set of reactions, questions and value-judgments.
This quandary is useful as a reminder that law does not originate from objective
sources merely for the purpose of achieving objective results. Indeed, especially in a
field like campaign finance, in which some kind of regulation is fundamental for
bringing some kind of order to an inherently disorderly democratic process, the
prospect of attaining political goals often frames one’s value-judgments about
desirable process. Frankly, how could it be otherwise in a democratic state?
47
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A. Picture 1: Norman Rockwell, Freedom of Speech (1943)

Picture 1: Freedom of Speech
Illustration © SEPS. Licensed by
Curtis Licensing. All Rights Reserved.

What does this painting reveal? The focus is on a “regular Joe”
expressing a viewpoint. Other people—from different walks of life—
are listening to him. Is government in the painting? If so, is it an
idealized depiction of American government, or rather of just one
narrow element of American government at the core of the First
Amendment, the town meeting?
If it is not government itself that is depicted, perhaps the viewer
perceives instead the absence of government that lies at the heart of
the First Amendment. Rockwell shows and the viewer “hears the
voice” of a “common man;” no government is censoring or restricting
him, except perhaps invisibly and benignly with respect to time, place
and manner.
The painting invites a positive reaction to a man who is able to
“speak his piece” at a public meeting and therefore for a “system”
that protects his right to do so. Would that positive feeling be
diminished if the central figure was painted as wearing a company
decal or lobbyist badge?
The speaker is “standing up” for what he believes. His speech
has the attention of both the viewer and the painted audience. The
speaker is seen as perhaps a little uncomfortable at first but ultimately
unafraid to be identified with his own speech. If the speaker is seen
as authentic, presumably both audiences are giving serious
consideration to his message.
Rockwell did not paint a literal speech. Rather, what is being
said is left to the imagination of The Saturday Evening Post and
51

Norman Rockwell, Freedom of Speech [Painting], THE SATURDAY EVENING POST,
Feb. 20, 1943, available at http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/powers_of_persuasion
/four_freedoms/four_freedoms.html. Rockwell painted a series of four paintings
based on President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” speech of January 6,
1941.
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broader American audience. To fully consider the merits of that
speech, what other facts might be relevant?
For example, would it matter if this common man has been paid
to give his own opinion? How important is that information for
judging the merits of his argument? Further, what if the speaker has
not only been paid, but is actually offering an opinion that is not his
own? To put the issue another way: would an audience’s positive
feelings about the depicted speech change if the speaker has been
paid to present a third party’s viewpoint but that fact is kept secret?
If inauthenticity detracts from persuasiveness, how important is
it to know the identity of the speaker, and whether he’s speaking his
own viewpoint without representing another party or merely serving
as the mouthpiece for another?
Returning to the painting, just as important as his speech is the
depiction of audience. The audience members are shown to be
listening, giving the speaker his chance to persuade. The audience
members are shown to care enough to listen respectfully. Each
person is drawn to be free to reach his or her own conclusions.
Rockwell celebrates how respectful attention informs both freedom
and ability to think. “Freedom of Speech” reveals an artist’s pride in
a system in which ordinary people reach consensus by speaking and
52
listening to each other.
Furthermore, distinctions of class are not absent from the
painting: the speaker is dressed in work clothes, listeners wear jackets
and ties. Thus the ability to persuade and willingness to listen are
shown as ideals that are not or should not be constrained by class
distinctions. The painting suggests democracy grows stronger when
people from different walks of life come together to make decisions.
From another perspective, Rockwell’s painting may be
recognized as an “independent expenditure” highlighting the value
of political speech itself—in a very positive way. The speaker’s
expression suggests he is not an experienced public speaker, yet he
appears to be thoughtful, perhaps to recite from memory something
he has planned to say. Also, no one in this painting looks angry—
instead we see an idealized civil society thriving by speaking, listening,
52

In Search of Norman Rockwell’s America: A Resource Guide for the Special Exhibition,
THE JOHN AND MABLE RINGLING MUSEUM OF ART, available at http://www.ringling.org
/uploadedFiles/Resources/Education/Details/InSearchofNormanRockwelldocentp
acketfinal.pdf (“In 1942 Rockwell attended a town meeting in Arlington, Vermont on
construction of the local school. One of his neighbors expressed an unpopular
opinion, but the rest of the people in attendance let the man finish what he had to
say. This, Rockwell decided, epitomized freedom of speech.”).
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and thinking.
Finally, the Rockwell painting, much like the celebration of free
speech in Citizens United, is extremely simplistic—there is no passion,
armband, or corporate puppet-master that could complicate the
positive value of political speech. Were the speaker depicted as a
demagogue or capitalist tool at a rally where the audience is
apparently being swayed by an appeal to prejudice or being
bombarded with misinformation, the viewer would likely have a
different reaction.
Speaking of extremes, the next picture reveals character in a
Candidate.
53

B. Picture 2: Thomas Nast, “The ‘Brains’” (1870)

Picture 2: Thomas Nast,
"The Brains"

54

Nast is the anti-Rockwell. His cartoon indicates a very different
view of politics: cynical, fearful, mocking, nasty. The figure depicted
draws dislike, scorn, and fear. He is Boss Tweed, a defiant
embodiment of the corruption of public service by money.
The cartoon’s subject is especially feared because he wields
power. He is anti-democratic in that his only motivation is desire for
self-enrichment. That goal may be a competitive virtue in a freemarket economy, but it is contrary to the meaning of public service.
His desire for payoffs suggests he will ultimately serve only those
willing to enrich him.
The money bag seems to be Nast’s manner of unveiling Tweed’s
secret true nature, one that Tweed certainly strove to conceal from
public scrutiny up through indictment, conviction, and
53

Thomas Nast, The Brains, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Oct. 21, 1871 (a caricature of
William M. (“Boss”) Tweed).
54
See, e.g., FIONA DEANS HALLORAN, THOMAS NAST: THE FATHER OF MODERN
POLITICAL CARTOONS (1st Ed. 2013).
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imprisonment. This is additionally unsettling since his constituents
generally would not know what goals are driving his actions. The
public’s victimization is complete precisely because Tweed’s selfaggrandizement has been hidden.
This caricature is a challenge to the electorate to hold
accountable and ultimately prevent Tweed and other politicians of
his kind from holding public office or exercising any kind of public
power. If this kind of politician should appear, an appropriate
response would be to have him handcuffed and arrested. But that
poses a problem: the public doesn’t know this secret mind.
Moreover, it is not a politician’s mere thoughts or motivations that
would be actionable as corruption; only actual behavior matters.
Before punitive measures may be justified as taken in response to
criminal acts, this cartoon suggests some kind of proactive limits on
the politician’s behavior may be needed to deter criminality and
safeguard the public against possibly nefarious motivations.
But Nast does not clearly identify any solutions. Instead, there is
defiance in Tweed’s posture and self-satisfaction in his girth. His
dimensions suggest the task will be daunting and underscore Nast’s
56
explicit challenge, “what are you going to do about it?” One may
see in Nast’s cartoon the very essence of the argument for campaign
finance reform, “money corrupts politicians,” ironically, perhaps, in
the form of an attack ad.
Finally, there are Voters. Unlike speakers and candidates, the
voters’ role is played en masse. Voters vote en masse. In the days and
months before an election, voters are subject to mass appeals. What
image might suggest how voters perceive this process of being
informed?

55

Renée Lettow Lerner, Thomas Nast’s Crusading Legal Cartoons, GREEN BAG
ALMANAC
59,
63
(2011),
available
at
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1289&context=faculty_publications (noting that the
Tweed Ring controlled much of the press with a combination of bribes and threats).
56
This question also appears in a second Nast drawing, The Tammany Tiger Loose,
HARPER’S WEEKLY, Nov. 11, 1871, published shortly before the election and depicting
a Roman Empire-style arena where the Emperor (Tweed) and his Ring watch the
Tammany Tiger maul the republic, symbolized by Columbia. Her ballot box lies
broken at her side. See HALLORAN, supra note 54, at 139–40.
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C. Picture 3: Jackson Pollock, Autumn Rhythm (Number 30) (1950)

57

Picture 3: © 2013 The PollockKrasner Foundation / Artists
Rights Society (ARS), New
York

Unlike the other two pictures, the Pollock painting is not overtly
political. For many voters, the act of voting is their primary—and
perhaps—only overtly political act. Many factors influence lives lived
primarily in a non-political space. Various speech may be hurled at
voters that later comes to bear on the decisions taken in a voting
booth. It is therefore likely appropriate to consider a vision that is a
blur of images. Hard as it may have been to read Tweed’s mind, at
least until revealed by Nast, it is that much harder to assess what a
mass of voters may glean from the variety of messages generated
during an election campaign.
For these reasons, an abstract expression may be as good a
starting point as any for trying to unravel the role speech plays in
influencing an electorate. How does the voter experience an election
campaign? Is it an experience of bombardment? Of mind-numbing
redundancy?
Of being swayed back and forth?
Of finding
confirmation of pre-formed conclusions?
Of cacophony that
overwhelms the ability to find coherent meaning?
Of being
dissuaded from participating? Do many voters find they ultimately
learn little to nothing that helps them reach an informed decision?
Or, is it an experience where the voter feels enabled to
intelligently draw together different strands of information from
many sources, both dominant and secondary? Does this information
dissemination help the voter to “think for herself?” Does this process
allow the voter to see a bigger picture that enables her to make
choices in casting a ballot to best serve her self-interest and that of
57

Painted in 1950, Autumn Rhythm (Number 30) is on display at the
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City, see http://www.metmuseum.org
/toah/works-of-art/57.92.
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her community, state, and nation?
Prior to an election, voters are the central focus of a process of
information distribution and intake. Are we concerned that the
quality of governance is diminished when voters are subjected to
appeals to emotion, misinformation, one-sided messaging, or other
“distortions” that impede rational decision making? Or, do we
inherently distrust government- and self-appointed communication
referees (including the press) in a high-stakes game that determines
the distribution of power in our society?
The Pollock painting suggests that not all speech is equal.
Messages come in various forms and sizes, and from different
directions. Does that inequality pose problems? Some of these
expressions appear contradictory or conflicting. Other messages
seem more harmonious, achieving a reinforcing echo effect. At over
eight by seventeen feet in scale, the work dwarfs the viewer, much like
a voter may think expenditures on campaign communications are
excessive. But why does it matter how much is spent on conveying
information to voters? Does it matter if some spending sources
predominate—or which sources predominate?
Is there an
information-distribution process that best suits most voters? Beyond
casting a ballot, what other responsibilities or conveniences should
voters have as active or passive consumers of political information?
Finally, like the Rockwell and Nast works, the Pollock painting
may be imagined as an independent expenditure or, perhaps, all
independent expenditures seen en masse.
Does the resulting
abstraction sow confusion in the electorate? Or is abstraction actually
a clever means of leading voters to conclusions the speaker/spender
intended? Either way, does the painting make a case for more public
disclosure of political spending sources, so that voters may make
judgments informed by a context that is deeper than the message
itself?
V. CONCLUSION
Unlike most legislation, the prospect of any change in campaign
58
finance law is a direct threat to every elected official’s self-interest.
58

Bradley A. Smith, The Separation of Campaign and State, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/27/the-court-and-thefuture-of-public-financing/the-courts-separation-of-campaign-and-state
(“It
is
dangerous to have the incumbent government directly involved in shaping the
quantity and substance of the very debate intended to determine how voters judge
that government’s performance on election day.”).
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Sometimes this threat is trumped by a corollary opportunity for
personal or partisan gain that makes change seem worth the risk. But
neither of these phenomena facilitates reaching consensus on reform
among opposing partisan opponents.
Ideally, law is the product of rational minds. Thus, “rational
basis” is a bedrock principle of constitutional jurisprudence. What, if
any, campaign finance rules would be the consensus choice among
persons who neither hold nor aspire to elective office? What values
would their choices reflect? Would those choices and the values they
embody withstand scrutiny under the Constitution?
The majority in Citizens United proclaims that speech directed to
and among the citizenry is vital for the protection of enlightened self59
government.
It is this exchange of information that leads to
60
consensus.
Yet it is likely fantasy to think we can seek or find
consensus on how to re-shape campaign finance law through gut
reactions to some pictures. But then again, if we simply cannot trust
visceral responses to speech and images precisely because such results
are obtained through manipulation and repetition, haven’t we then
lost faith in democracy as we know it?
As Thomas Nast might have asked: what are you going to do
about it?

59
60

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).
See id.

